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The traditional rationale for the legal protection of trade
marks is that trade marks protect consumers from con
fusion and reduce consumer search costs in the market
place. Producers use trade marks to distinguish their
goods and services from the goods and services of their
competitors. Facilitating competition is therefore a fun
damental, underlying principle of trade mark law. Trade
mark protection provides incentives to producers to
invest in consistency and quality, which benefits con
sumers. Trade marks thus have origin, guarantee and
investment functions. They are indicators of trade
source, they serve as guarantees of quality, and they
provide a mechanism and incentive for investment in
advertising and promotion.'
Trade marks are designed to facilitate competition for
the benefit of consumers. Facilitating competition
requires the identification of competitors, and, because
competition only takes place in markets, identifying
competitors must involve some more or less explicit
exercise in market definition. Competition law offers a
relatively developed approach to market definition and
market analysis, drawing on economic principles and
economic evidence. However, while courts in trade
mark cases are regularly required to consider competi
tion and competitors, they do not use competition law
market analysis for this purpose.
This article argues for the adoption by courts of com
petition law market analysis in trade mark cases. The
article first outlines the competition law approach to
market definition under the Commerce Act 1986, and
then identifies the registration and infringement provi
sions under the Trade Marks Act 2002 under which a
market assessment is required in order to identify com
petition and competitors. The article then analyses
1 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner "Trademark law:
An Economic Perspective" 1987 30 J.L & Econ. 265, cited
with approval in Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd
[1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 332 at 36 1-362. See also W. Cornish and D.
Llewellyn, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks
and Allied Rights 5th ed., 2003, pp.586-592; L. Beady and B.
Sherman, Intellectual Property Law 2001, pp.661-665.
recent cases in which New Zealand courts have con
sidered registration and infringement of particular trade
marks, and the approach that has been taken to the
assessment of competition and markets, concluding
that, even in recent cases, courts do not use competition
law market definition. It is argued that the quality of
analysis in trade mark cases would be enhanced if law
yers and the judiciary were to explicitly adopt a com
petition law style approach to market definition in these
cases, and that this would also lead to more predictable
outcomes based on empirical evidence. There is con
gruence in the purposes of trade mark law and competi
tion law, both of which are crafted to protect consumers
by protecting competition, and this congruence of pur
pose supports the use of economics-based market anal
ysis in trade mark law, as in competition law.
Market definffion under the Commerce Act
1986
The purpose of the Commerce Act 1986 is to promote
competition in markets for the long-term benefit of con
sumers within New Zealand.2 This reflects the central
concern of antitrust and competition laws internatio
nally-the promotion of competition-and competition
takes place, if at all, in markets. An initial step in assess
ing competition and market power is to define the rele
vant market. Market definition is a fundamental
element of New Zealand competition law under the
Commerce Act 1986. In relation to most restrictive
trade practices, the Commerce Act requires identifica
tion of a market or markets in which the practices have
restricted competition. For example, s.27 prohibits con
tracts, arrangements or understandings with the pur
pose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening
competition, s.29 has a substantial lessening of com
petition element, and s.36 refers to taking advantage of
market power for the purpose of restricting entry into a
market, preventing or deterring competitive conduct in
a market, or eliminating a person from a market. All
these provisions require market definition as a first step
in assessing the effect on competition. The business
acquisitions provisions also require market definition.
Section 47 prohibits business acquisitions that would
have, or would be likely to have, the effect of substan
tially lessening competition in a market. A market defi
nition exercise is therefore required as an essential first
step in determining liability under virtually all the sub
stantive provisions of the Commerce Act.
In competition law, market definition is based on eco
nomic principles and economic evidence. cc [A] market
is the arena within which significant substitution in con
sumption or production occurs. That arena tends to
exhibit uniform prices throughout."3 The Commerce
Act defines a market as4 cca market in New Zealand for
goods or services as well as other goods or services that,
2 Commerce Act 1986 s.1A.
3 Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law: An Analysis ofAntitrust
Principles and their Application 2nd ed., 2002, para.530a, at
p.180 internal quotations omitted.
4 Commerce Act 1986 s.31A.
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as a matter of fact and commercial common sense, are
substitutable for them".
Competition law markets are generally understood to
have dimensions of product, space, functional level and
time.5 `Where relevant, the Commerce Commission also
defines the market in relation to the fifth, customer,
dimension, considering different customer types within
a market.6 Most important are the product and geo
graphic markets. In relation to product, the Commerce
Commission and the courts will consider economic
substitutability on both demand and supply side, with
reference where available to cross-price elasticities.7
The geographic market includes all the sources of sup
ply to which buyers can turn if local prices increase.8
Courts in competition law cases define markets to
assess market structure and market shares, from which
the courts can then assess market power.9 Market defi
nition is, therefore, an instrumental concept.'° To be a
useful instrument, the market defined has to be the
market relevant to the alleged competition law violation
at issue, and different markets within the same industry
may be present for different competition law pur
poses.11 Competition law market definition is therefore
a flexible concept that draws on economic principles to




Section 5 of the Trade Marks Act 2002 provides that a
"trade mark"
"a means any sign capable of-
i being represented graphically; and
ii distinguishing the goods or services of 1 person
from those of another person
Section 5 also provides that a "sign" includes
"a a brand, colour, device, heading, label, letter, name,
numeral, shape, signature, smell, sound, taste, ticket, or
word; and
b any combination of signs".
Part 2 of the Trade Marks Act 2002 provides for trade
mark registration. Section 13 provides that a trade mark
is registrable in respect of goods and/or services within
one or more classes if an appropriate application is
made, prescribed fees are paid, and the Commissioner
of Trade Marks is satisfied that there are no absolute or
relative grounds that would prevent registration. Abso
lute grounds for not registering a trade mark are set out
5 Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd [1988] 2
N.Z.L.R. CA 35 at, 359. See also discussion in M. Brunt,
"`Market Definition' issues in Australian and New Zealand
Trade Practices Litigation" in M. Brunt, Economic Essays on
Australian and New Zealand Competition Law 2003, p.205.
6 Commerce Commission, Mergers and Acquisitions Guidelines
December 2003, p.14.
7 ibid., at pp.14-20.
8 ibid.; Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars
Auckland Airport Ltd [1987] 2 N.Z.L.R. 641 at 677.
9 Areeda ec al., n.3 above, paras 531e and 532a, at p.190.
10 Telecom v Commerce Commission 1991 4 T.C.L.R. 473 at
499-500, citing Queensland Wire Industries Pry Ltd v The Broken
Hill Proprietary Co Ltd 1989 83 A.L.R. 577 at 582-583.
11 Areeda er al., n.3 above, para.553, at pp.202-203.
in sub-part 2. Of relevance to this article are s.171a
and s.18.12 Each of these provisions potentially requires
the identification of competitors within a market set
ting, and therefore requires an identification of the rele
vant market.
Likely to deceive or cause confusion
Section 171a provides that the commissioner must
not "register as a trade mark or part of a trade mark any
matter the use of which would be likely to deceive or
cause confusion". This provision replaces s. 161 of the
Trade Marks Act 1953 which provided that:
"It shall not be lawful to register as a trade mark or part
of a trade mark any scandalous matter or any matter the
use of which would be likely to deceive or cause confu
sion or would be contrary to law or morality or would
otherwise be disentitled to protection in a Court of jus
tice".
The phrase "likely to deceive or cause confusion" was
considered by the Court of Appeal in Pioneer Hi-Bred
Corn Co v Ny-Line Chicks Pty Lcd.'3 In that case
Richardson J. held that it was clearly settled that in
considering the likelihood of deception or confusion all
the surrounding circumstances have to be taken into
consideration, including the circumstances in which the
applicant's mark may be used, the market in which the
goods may be bought and sold and the character of
those involved in that market.'4 However, he said that it
was the use of the mark in New Zealand that has to be
considered, and association of a similar mark with
another trader in overseas countries or markets is irrele
vant, except in so far as it bears on the likelihood of
deception or confusion in the New Zealand market.'5
He said that it was in relation to commercial dealings
that deception or confusion had to be considered and
that what was material was the states of mind of pro
spective or potential purchasers of "goods of the kind to
which the applicant may apply his mark" and of others
involved in the purchase transactions.'6 He went on to
say that the test does not require that all persons in the
market are likely to be deceived or confused, but that it
is not sufficient that someone in the market is likely to
be deceived or confused: "a balance has to be struck".'7
He said that the object of the section was not to protect
competitors and potential competitors but "to protect
the public interest by refusing to accord monopoly
12 s. 171a provides that the commissioner must not "regis
ter as a trade mark or part of a trade mark any matter the use of
which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion; s.1 81b
provides that the commissioner must not register a trade mark
that has no distinctive character or a sign that is descriptive;
s.181c provides that the commissioner must not register a
trade mark that "consists only of signs or indications that may
serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended
purpose, value, geographical origin, time of production of goods
or rendering of services, or other characteristics of goods or
services"; s.181d provides that the commissioner must not
register a trade mark that consists only of signs or indications
that have become customary in the current language or in the
bona fide and established practices of trade.
13 Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co v Ny-Line Chicks Pry Ltd [1978] 2
N.Z.L.R. 50.
14 ibid., at 61.
15 ibid.
16 ibid.
17 ibid., at 62.
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rights to a mark, the use of which is likely to deceive or
confuse those in the market for the goods".'8 Richard
son J. used the following test19:
"[H] aving regard to the awareness of the opponent's
mark in the New Zealand market for goods covered by
the registration proposed, would the use of the appli
cant's mark be likely to deceive or cause confusion to
persons in that market?"
Richardson J. said that the first step was to identify the
relevant New Zealand market or markets in which
goods covered by the mark applied for might be
expected to be sold. He went on to identify the market
on the facts of the case beginning with the class of goods
described in the application "live chickens and poul
try", but noting that it was common ground that the
market was confined to breeding poultry and did not
extend to retail sales. In so defining the relevant market
Richardson J. did not use competition law market defi
nition, and did not consider substitution. Instead he
took as a starting point the class of goods described in
the application. This approach draws on trade mark
classifications rather than on economic principle, and
consequently risks defining a market either too broadly
or too narrowly. This in turn could result in identifica
tion of an over-broad or over-narrow class of consumers
in that market, with consequent misleading results on
likely deception or confusion. By contrast, use of com
petition law market definition drawing on evidence of
substitution would provide a more empirically based
approach, and arguably more accurate, consistent and
predictable results in relation to s.171 assessments of
likely deception or confusion.
Subsequent cases have applied the Pioneer Hi-Bred
approach to likely deception or confusion. In these
cases courts have generally approached the assessment
of the market as Richardson J. did, without employing
competition law type market definition as part of the
analysis.2°
Distinctiveness
Distinctiveness requires that consumers are able to dif
ferentiate a mark from competing signs used by rival
traders, and that the trade mark can thereby function as
an indicator of source. Section 181b of the Trade
Marks Act 2002 provides that the commissioner must
not register a trade mark that has no distinctive charac
ter.2' This provision replaces the distinctiveness provi
sions in s.14 of the Trade Marks Act 1953.
18 ibid., at 63.
19 ibid.
20 For example, in Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budweiser Budvar
National Corporation [2001] 3 N.Z.L.R. 666 HC, [2003] 1
N.Z.L.R, 472 CA, Doogue J. in the High Court referred gen
erally to "beers on the New Zealand market," without any use of
competition law market definition. See also Unico Trading PTE
LTD v PT Indofood Sukses Makmur HC Wellington AP308/01
May 9, 2003, Goddard J.
21 In addition, s.181c provides that the commissioner
must not register a trade mark that "consists only of signs or
indications that may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, qual
ity, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, time
of production of goods or rendering of services, or other charac
teristics of goods or services". s.181d provides that the com
missioner must not register a trade mark that consists only of
signs or indications that have become customary in the current
language or in the bona fide and established practices of trade.
Nevertheless, courts considering the requirement of
"distinctive character" are likely to draw on concepts of
distinctiveness established under the Trade Marks Act
1953.
Under the 1953 Act, distinctiveness required that the
trade mark be "adapted to distinguish" the proprietor's
goods or services.22 Distinctiveness must be shown at
the time of application.23 In determining whether a
trade mark was adapted to distinguish, the commis
sioner or the court might have regard to the extent to
which the trade mark was "inherently adapted to dis
tinguish", and the extent to which the trade mark was
"in fact adapted to distinguish" by reason of its use or
other circumstances.24 Inherent distinctiveness in this
context referred to a mark's being adapted or capable of
distinguishing goods without showing use of the mark.
Generally invented words such as Kodak would qualify
as inherently distinctive. Distinctiveness in fact referred
to distinctiveness acquired through use of the mark.
Case law also required that other traders could not
legitimately desire to use the trade mark, for example to
describe their goods and services.25 The rationale here
is that competitors should not be prevented from using
signs that are essential in trade to convey information
about their goods and services. The New Zealand
Court of Appeal has referred to the speech of Lord
Parker in Registrar of Trade Marks v W & G du Cros
Ltd26:
"The applicant for registration in effect says, `I intend to
use this mark as a trade mark, ie, for the purpose of
distinguishing my goods from the goods of other per
sons,' and the Registrar or the Court has to determine
before the mark be admitted to registration whether it is
of such a kind that the applicant, quite apart from the
effects of registration, is likely or unlikely to attain the
object he has in view. The applicant's chance of success in
this respect must, I think, largely depend upon whether
other traders are likely, in the ordinary course of their
business and without any improper motive, to desire to
use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it,
upon or in connection with their own goods. It is appar
ent from the history of trade marks in this country that
both the Legislature and the Courts have always shewn a
natural disinclination to allow any person to obtain by
registration under the Trade Marks Acts a monopoly in
what others may legitimately desire to use."
The distinctive character requirement is therefore
designed to facilitate competition in markets for goods
and services, and to prevent monopolisation by partic
ular traders of marks "that might reasonably be used in
relation to products of the kind in question".27 The
22 Trade Marks Act 1953 s.142.
23 McCain Foods Aust Pty Ltd v Conagra, Inc [2002] 3
N.Z.L.R. 40 at 49.
24 Trade Marks Act 1953 s.143.
25 W & G du Cros's LtdApplication [1913] A.C. 624 at 635.
26 ibid., cited in McCain Foods Aust Pty Ltd v Conagra, Inc
[2002] 3 N.Z.L.R. 40 at 44.
27 McCain Foods, n.26 above, at 50. On this point see also
Duckworth, Turner and Co Ltd v Commissioner of Trade Mar/es
[1959] N.Z.L.R. 1341, Haslam J. The description of trade
marks as creating "monopoly" rights is not strictly accurate in
economic terms, and this terminology is no longer common.
See Levi Strauss & Co v Kimbyr Investments Ltd, n. 1 above, at
361-362 The goal of protecting competition nevertheless
remains alive.
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concern here is to promote market freedom, allowing
other market traders to compete by using signs that are
commonplace, descriptive or generic.28 The issue com
monly arises in relation to descriptive marks.29 In
McCain Foods3° the New Zealand Court of Appeal
expressly affirmed the market freedom approach to dis
tinctiveness in relation to the mark Healthy Choice for
food products. Gault P. identified the issue as being
whether the combination of words gained from their
juxtaposition a sufficient identity and unusual conno
tation31:
"Do the words in combination convey a different mean
ing or allusion from that conveyed separately, or would
other traders in food products of the kind covered by the
application reasonably wish to use the word combination
in normal descriptive contexts in relation to their prod
ucts?"
In taking this approach the Court ofAppeal declined to
take the approach taken by the European Court ofJus
tice in the Baby Dry case.32 In that case the ECJ moved
away from the market freedom approach which
emphasises the legitimate interests of competing trad
ers, and favoured instead an approach that would allow
registration of descriptive signs unless they could not
actually fulfil the trade mark function as indicators of
trade origin.33 Gault P. rejected this approach, and said
that it was unlikely that Baby Dry would qualify for
registration in New Zealand.34 New Zealand law there
fore continues to take a market freedom approach to
distinctiveness, and does not permit monopolisation
through registration by one trader of signs other trad
ers might reasonably use in relation to similar prod
ucts.
Application of the distinctive character requirement
necessarily involves identification of competitors and
prospective and potential consumers, and therefore
identification of the relevant market. Further, the Court
f Appeal has observed that use by traders in relation to
ifferent goods or in different markets may assist in deter
lining distinctiveness, depending on the circum
tances.35 However, the Commissioner and the courts
do not generally use competition law style market defi
nition for this purpose. The Court of Appeal in the
McCain Foods case did not undertake a market defini
tion exercise, and neither did the High Court in Frucor
Beverages Ltd v Commissioner of Trade Marks.36 In that
case distinctiveness was an issue in relation to the mark
Just for food products. John Hansen J. said that "It isthe potential use of the word by other traders dealing in
28 See Uma Suthersanen, "The European Court of Justice in
Philips v Remington-Trade Marks and Market Freedom"
2003 3 I.P.Q. 257.
29 Trade Marks Act 2002, s. 18
30 McCain Foods, n.26 above.
31 ibid., at [51].
32 Procter & Gamble Co v Office for I-Iarmonisation in the Inter
nal Market Trade Marks and Designs [2001] EWCA Civ 1142,
[2002] Ch. 82.
33 See Tim Pfeiffer, "Descriptive Trade Marks: The Impact of
the Baby Dry Case Considered" [2002] E.I.P.R. 373.
34 McCain Foods, n.26 above, at 51.
35 ibid., at 49.
36 [2001] 1 N.Z.L.R. 362 at 369. John Hansen J. also citedLord Parker in Re Wand G du Cros Ltd's Applications 1913 30
R.P.C. 660 at 672.
the same class of products or services which is relevant
to an application for registration".
The judge found that it had not been shown that the
markJust was sufficiently distinctive for registration and
"other traders should not be prevented from using a
term which has become an acceptable feature of the
marketing ofproducts in this field".37 The judge did not
undertake any exercise in competition law style market
definition in the course of his analysis.
It might be argued that a market definition exercise
was unnecessary in McCain Foods and Frucor, because
both involve a range of food products, and the result in
each case was unlikely to be affected by finding a
broader or narrower market definition. However, there
are other cases in which a finding on market definition
would make a difference to the outcome of the case. For
example, distinctiveness was an issue in relation to the
mark Black Water Rafting in Waitomo Adventures Ltd v
BWR Resources Ltd,38 and the mark was held by the
High Court not to be distinctive. WAL presented evi
dence of a survey of members of the general public aged
15 years and over, the results of which suggested that
the mark was used descriptively to refer to the activity
rather than to refer to a particular company. Randerson
J. accepted criticism of that evidence on the grounds
that the general New Zealand public were not the mar
ket for the activity, because 75-80 per cent of consum
ers were visitors from overseas, and few were New
Zealanders over 55. It was suggested that a survey of
"actual or potential users on a representative basis"
would have been more useful.39 It was also suggested
that evidence from providers, travel agents or tourism
promoters would have been useful.4° These criticisms
reflect a lack of clarity on the facts as to what consti
tuted the relevant market, but there was no use of eco
nomic market definition, and no competition law style
analysis. Use of such an analysis by both the parties and
the court could have resulted in better quality survey
evidence being led, and a result based on strong empiri
cal analysis.
In some cases courts do consider and make a finding
on the definition of the relevant market for distinctive
ness purposes, but without undertaking a competition
law style market definition exercise using economic
principles and economic evidence. For example, dis
tinctiveness was an issue in Re United Air Lines,4' in
relation to the mark B-Ticket. In the High Court John
Hansen J. considered distinctiveness in relation to the
"New Zealand market for passengers using travel and
reservation services".42 He thus identified a relevant
market, but did not undertake a market definition exer
cise. Similarly, in Resene Paints Ltd v Orica New Zealand
Ltd,43 Hammond J. considered the protection of paint
names, although the case was in passing off, as the
marks were unregistered. In so doing, he distinguished
the premium paint market from the non-premium paint
37 [2001] 1 N.Z.L.R. 362 at 370.
38 Waitomo Adventures Ltd v BWR Resources Ltd High Court,
Hamilton, CP72/00 April 26, 2002, Randerson J.39 ibid., at [30].
40 Waitomo Adventures Lid, n.38 above, at [31].
41 Re UnitedAir Lines High Court, Auckland AP 404/149/00
March 5, 2001, John Hansen J.42 ibid., at [5].
43 [2003] 3 N.Z.L,R. 709.
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market, but did so without reference to economic evidence as to whether or not consumers see these paintsas being substitutes, and in what circumstances.
Resene had accepted Orica's use of the names in thenon-premium market, but brought proceedings when
Orica commenced use in the premium market. Orica
argued that the names had not become distinctive of
Resene's products. Resene obtained an interlocutory
injunction. At trial, the court's decision on the relevant
market may well make a difference to the outcome in
the case. It would be desirable if the finding on the
relevant market was based on the kind of economic
analysis used in competition cases.
Shape marks
Distinctiveness is a particular issue in relation to shape
marks, which are not explicitly included as trade marks
under the definition of "sign" in the Trade Marks Act
2002. In assessing distinctiveness in relation to shape
marks, courts consider whether rival traders need to use
the shape in order to compete.45 Where competitors do
need to use a shape, then the shape mark may be
excluded from registration as not being distinctive.4o
Any assessment of distinctiveness in this context neces
sarily involves some identification of a market in order
to identify competitors. If the market is defined nar
rowly then competitors will be seen to need to use that
shape to compete. However, if it is defined broadly,
then a range of possible substitutes exist, and com
petitors need not therefore use the trade mark shape to
compete.
New Zealand courts have not as yet had to deal with
issues of distinctiveness in relation to shape marks.
However, shape marks have been considered in other
jurisdictions. In Koninklzjke Philzps Electronis NV v
Remington Consumer Products Ltd,47 the European Court
of Justice considered a shape mark under European law.
The case involved an electric shaver with a head consist
ing of three rotary blades arranged in a triangular pat
tern, and a registered trade mark that was a graphic
representation of the shaver head. Under s.31e of
the Directive48 signs cannot be registered if they consist
44 In distinctiveness cases, courts generally take the view that
distinctiveness is easier to prove among purchasers of expensive
or specialised goods than among purchasers of cheaper goods.
See Advantage Group Ltd v Advantage Computers Ltd [2002] 3
N.Z.L.R. 741 at 746 CA. This is based on the assumption
that consumers are less likely to make impulse purchases of
expensive goods. However, this view is not necessarily based on
empirical evidence, and has the potential to distort findings on
whether goods are in competition, by finding effectively separate
markets for expensive and cheap goods which may actually be
regarded by consumers as being substitutes and in the same
market.
45 Considerations of functionality are not expressly provided
for in the Trade Marks Act 2002. Such provisions were con
sidered by the Commerce Select Committee, but the committee
preferred to rely on the general tests for distinctiveness. S. Fran
kel and G. McLay, Intellectual Property in New Zealand 2002,
p.432.
46 It was concern to protect competition that led to the long
standing prohibition on shape trade marks. See Re Coca Cola
[1986] 2 All E.R. 274, HL.
47 [2002] C.M.L.R 1329 AGO and ECD. See also Konin
klijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington [1999] F.C.A 816.
48 Council Directive 89/104, implemented in the United
Kingdom by the Trade Marks Act 1994.
exclusively of icthe shape of goods which is necessary toobtain a technical result". The Court of Justice heldthat the provision:
"must be interpreted to mean that a sign consisting
exclusively of the shape of a product is unregistrable by
virtue thereof if it is established that the essential func
tional features of that shape are attributable only to the
technical result. Moreover, the ground for refusal or inva
lidity of registration imposed by that provision cannot be
overcome by establishing that there are other shapes
which allow the same technical result to be obtained".
This approach arguably does not require an exercise in
market definition, as it does not consider substitutes.
New Zealand law, however, has no equivalent provision
to s.3le, so that courts can be expected to take an
approach that does allow consideration of substitute
shapes available to competitors, under general distinct
iveness law. An exercise in market definition drawing on
evidence as to what products consumers regard as sub
stitutes will be relevant. If the market is defined nar
rowly for example, shavers with three heads in a
triangle pattern then a court will be likely to find that
competitors need to use this shape to compete, and will
be less likely to find distinctiveness. On the other hand,
if the market is defined broadly for example, electric
shavers then a court will be much less likely to find that
competitors need to use the mark to compete, and con
sequently more likely to find distinctiveness.
A US case is also illustrative. In re Weber-Stephen
Products Co49 this involved an application for registra
tion of a design of a barbecue grill that used a "kettle
body and legs," which was rejected by the Examining
Attorney as functional.5° In arguing that the mark was
not functional, the applicant presented extensive evi
dence of alternative shapes and designs. The Board held
that51:
"In summary, the evidence indicates that a wide variety
of alternative barbeque grill designs, including other cov
ered round designs, is available to applicant's competi
tors, and that applicant's covered round design is not
superior, in cooking performance, to any of the other
covered designs, be they round, square, rectangular, or
whatever".
The Board also found no evidence that the applicant's
design was cheaper or simpler to make than existing
grills.52 The Board held that the mark was not func
tional.53 It thus gave careful consideration to the needs
of competitors. Although it did not undertake an
express exercise in market definition, the Board effec
tively found that there was a market for barbecue grills
in which the applicant's design was just one of a number
of substitute grill designs.54
In relation to distinctiveness of both word and shape
marks, it is argued that use of competition law style
market definition in identifying competitors is likely to
produce more robust and predictable decisions, based
on economic principles and economic evidence.
49 In re Weber-Stephen Products Co 3 U.S.P.Q. 2d BNA 1659
T.T.A.B. 1987.
50 ibid.
51 In re Weber-Stephen, n.49 above, at 1668.
52 ibid., at 1668-1669.
53 ibid., at 1669-1670.
54 ibid., at 1667.
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Trade mark infringement
Market definition also arises in relation to trade mark
infringement. Section 89 of the Trade Marks Act 2002
provides that:
"1 A person infringes a registered trade mark if the
person does not have the right to use the registered trade
mark and uses in the course of trade a sign-
a identical with the registered trade mark in relation
to any goods or services in respect of which the trade
mark is registered; or
b identical with the registered trade mark in relation
to any goods or services that are similar to any goods or
services in respect of which the trade mark is regis
tered, if that use would be likely to deceive or confuse;
or
c similar to the registered trade mark in relation to
any goods or services in respect of which the trade
mark is registered if that use would be likely to deceive
or confuse; or
d identical with or similar to the registered trade
mark in relation to any goods or services that are not
similar to the goods or services in respect of which the
trade mark is registered where the trade mark is well
known in New Zealand and the use of the sign takes
unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the mark.
2 Subsection 1 applies only if the sign is used in such
a manner as to render the use of the sign as likely to be
taken as being use as a trade mark.
3 Sections 92-98 override this section".
In infringement proceedings, courts in some cases are
required to decide whether a sign is used in relation to
goods or services similar to those in respect of which it
is registered. In deciding whether goods or services are
similar, courts are effectively deciding whether the
goods or services are in competition. In order to be in
competition, they must be operating in the same mar
ket, so that an exercise in market definition is required
for this analysis. However, courts generally do not use a
competition law style market definition for this purpose.
The starting point is the class of goods or services for
which the mark is registered, rather than the goods or
services which consumers regard as substitutes. How
ever, the fact that they are registered in different classes
is not conclusive that they are not similar.
In British Sugar Plc v .7ames Robertson & Sons Ltd,56
Jacob J. considered the question of similarity of goods
and services in s.102 of the Trade Marks Act 1994
UK. He observed that the wider the scope of the
concept, the wider the absolute scope of protection of a
mark, saying that in effect a registration covers the
goods of the specification plus similar goods. This sug
gested a need for caution as it widened the scope of
actual protection, and could do so even in cases where
distinctiveness was shown only for a narrow class of
55 See discussion in L. Bentley and B. Sherman, Intellectual
Property Law 2001, pp.821-822.
56 [1996] R.P.C. 281. See also the ECJ decision in Canon
Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer [1999] 1 C.M.L.R. 77
at [23]: "In assessing the similarity of the goods or services
concerned, as the French and UK governments and the Com
mission have pointed out, all the relevant factors relating to those
goods or services themselves should be taken into account.
Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their end users
and their method of use and whether they are in competition
with each other or are complementary."
goods.57 Jacob J. said that the purpose of the "similar
goods" provision, as with the earlier Act, was to protect
marks "not only for their respective actual goods but for
a penumbra also".58 He said the following factors must
be relevant in considering similarity59:
"a The respective uses of the respective goods or
services;
b The respective users of the respective goods or
services;
c The physical nature of the goods or acts of service;
d The respective trade channels through which the
goods or services reach the market;
e In the case of self-serve consumer items, where in
practice they are respectively found or likely to be found
in supermarkets and in particular whether they are, or are
likely to be, found on the same or different shelves;
1 The extent to which the respective goods or services
are competitive. This inquiry may take into account how
those in trade classify goods, for instance whether market
research companies, who of course act for industry, put
the goods or services in the same or different sectors."
Jacob J. said that the similarity requirement "introduced
an area of uncertainty into the scope of registration
which in many cases can only be resolved by litiga
tion" 60 He said that the list provided only general guid
ance. He also said that, in some cases, goods could be
similar to services "a service of repair might well be
similar to the goods repaired, for instance".6'
This approach involves considering whether goods or
services are in competition, and requires identification
of channels of trade. However, the approach to identify
ing competitors is very different from the economic
approach taken by courts in competition law cases.
Jacob J.'s approach to identifying whether goods or
services are in competition takes into account how those
in trade classify goods, but does not, at least explicitly,
take into account whether consumers regard the goods
or services as substitutable. The approach also takes
account of factors that may or may not link to substitut
ability, for example the physical nature of goods or serv
ices. In applying his approach to the facts, Jacob J. did
not undertake a full market definition exercise and did
not use economic evidence. His conclusion on the facts
was a narrow one, finding that a sweet syrup to be
poured over desserts was not similar to a sweet-
flavoured spread.62
The New Zealand Court of Appeal referred to the
similar goods or services provision in infringement in
Advantage Group Ltd v Advantage Computers Ltd.63 In
that case the Court of Appeal considered the distinct
iveness of the trade markAdvantage. The court said that
registration is not limited precisely to goods or services
on which the mark has been used, and reasonable gen
eralisation recognises the reality of the market-place.
Thus "distinctiveness proved in relation to raspberry
jam will flow over to other jams". However, "distinctive
ness in relation to jam could not justify a registration
57 British Sugar, n.56 above, at 295,
58 ibid., at 296,
59 ibid., at 296-297.
60 ibid., at 297.
61 ibid.
62 ibid.
63 Advantage Group Ltd v Advantage Computers Ltd [2002] 3
N.Z.L.R. 741 CA.
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covering all foodstuffs".64 In that case, the Court of
Appeal did not discuss what approach a court should
take to determining the line between reasonable and
unreasonable generalisation to similar services, other
than saying that the approach should be "practical".65
Courts in trade mark infringement cases are therefore
required in similarity cases to consider whether goods
or services are in competition. However, while they do
consider competition, they do not use competition style
market definition, based on empirical economic evi
dence, in order to identify competitors.
App'ying competition law market definition
to trade mark law
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that, in relation to
both registration and infringement, courts in trade
mark cases are required to identify competitors and
competing products. In competition law cases, courts
would use established market definition techniques for
this purpose, drawing on economic evidence of sub
stitution by consumers as demonstrated by cross-price
elasticities. However, the same courts do not use com
petition law market definition to identify competition in
trade mark cases.
It is not clear why courts in trade mark cases do not
use competition law style market definition. It may be
that judges are reluctant to import competition law
market definition into trade mark law, as this would
require expensive and time-consuming economic evi
dence, which might be seen as a burden to both courts
and parties. While this may be an explanation, it is
argued that an economic approach should be preferred
if it improves the quality of decision-making, so long as
the costs do not outweigh the benefits. It may also be
that judges prefer the flexibility of a less formalised
approach, as it gives them more freedom to decide on
what they see as the overall justice of the case. The
64 ibid., at 746.
65 ibid., at 747.
benefits of this kind of flexibility should, however, be
weighed against the risk of uncertain results and the
difficulties posed for litigants and potential litigants.
Another explanation may be that reliance on precedent
means that lawyers do not argue trade mark cases on the
basis of competition law market definition, so that ade
quate economic evidence is not presented and judges do
not have a basis for a market definition finding. Thus,
even though competition market definition may offer a
better approach to decision-making, it may not be an
option for courts simply because it is not argued.
Whatever the explanation, this article argues that, in
areas of trade mark law in which courts are required to
identify competitors and consider competition, use of
competition law market definition would produce more
rational decision-making based on empirical evidence,
and would lead to more predictable and robust deci
sions. The primary goal of trade mark law is the facilita
tion of competition in order to protect consumers. This
goal is entirely consistent with the goals of competition
law. In cases where identification of competition and
competitors is required, it would be preferable to use
economic evidence. Use of competition law market def
inition would produce more empirically based results
and more consistent outcomes.
Conclusion
This article has reviewed the use of concepts of com
petition and markets in New Zealand trade mark law,
and has identified areas of trade mark registration and
infringement law in which decision-makers are required
to identify competitors and assess competition, Analysis
of recent case law has demonstrated that courts do not
use competition law market definition techniques for
this purpose, and possible explanations have been
reviewed. It is argued that use of competition law mar
ket definition in these areas of trade mark law would
enhance the quality of decision-making, producing
more robust and predictable results.
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